Can Knowledge Exist Independently of Culture?

Culture is a concept that summarizes what human beings do and how they do it. It encompasses the ways groups behave and the traditions associated with those behaviors, and it varies geographically from region to region. Knowledge is justified belief. Here, “justified” means that a belief has been granted legitimacy by people of the same era. If knowledge is independent of culture, then it must lead to the same conclusion regardless of the cultural context in which it is used or understood. I will elaborate on this definition in the main discussion. According to it, some knowledge is culturally independent while other knowledge is not. This depends greatly on the area of knowledge (AOK) and the methodologies employed within that area. In other words, whether knowledge is independent of culture is determined by how it is justified within its discipline. Knowledge has different levels of transcendence: it may be true across cultures, yet it cannot transcend an episteme. An episteme is the fundamental, unconscious framework of thought shared by an era. Modern people, for example, tend to think within frameworks such as “scientific reasoning” and “human rights.” Thus, “episteme” and “culture” are two concepts that must be clearly distinguished. For knowledge to be justified, it must pass through the episteme that forms the basis of perception; its character then changes according to the culture through which it is interpreted. In summary, knowledge in a given era is shaped by two criteria, “culture” and “episteme.” Because an episteme fundamentally defines the limits of thought, knowledge cannot exist beyond it. This essay will discuss culturally independent knowledge, culturally dependent knowledge, the reasons for each, and their implications.

Mathematics is the study of the properties and relationships of numbers and shapes using numbers and symbols. Its most distinctive feature is that it is based on a system of “axioms.” An axiom is a fundamental, self-evident principle accepted as true without proof and serves as the starting point of a theoretical system; it underlies all mathematical reasoning. For example, a statement such as “There is only one straight line passing through two points” is treated as a convention assumed to be true even though it cannot be rigorously proved within the system. Axioms are the same everywhere regardless of culture, and therefore mathematics is culturally independent: it reaches the same conclusions irrespective of cultural context. Axioms are independent of culture because they describe a natural world that exists absolutely, regardless of human subjectivity. Another reason mathematics is culturally independent is its use of deductive reasoning. Deduction is a method of logical inference that derives conclusions from universal principles or major premises (axioms). Since axioms can transcend culture, deductive reasoning based on them can do so as well.

For example, a certain mathematical expression is derived from the universal definitions and properties of trigonometric functions. Whether a Russian or a Korean derives it, the reasoning always reaches the same conclusion because of the properties of those functions. Since mathematics is a system developed from agreed-upon axioms that are independent of culture, mathematical reasoning arrives at the same conclusions wherever it is carried out.

Nevertheless, even this cultural independence is merely freedom within an axiomatic framework—that is, within an episteme. More specifically, the expression mentioned above is valid only within the framework of a particular geometry. Non-Euclidean geometry rejects the “parallel postulate” of Euclidean geometry, which concerns flat planes; in non-Euclidean geometry, the interior angles of a triangle do not necessarily add up to 180 degrees. Therefore, the expression in question cannot be derived in non-Euclidean geometry. Although the expression was independent of culture, it could not transcend its episteme. This is because the foundations of thought—namely, axioms—constitute an episteme. Only when the limits of a conceptual foundation such as Euclidean geometry are overcome and its axioms change does the scope of the episteme expand, allowing different knowledge to develop within the new domain.

Thus, in mathematics, once an episteme is established, no culture can intervene; mathematical knowledge changes only when axioms change and the episteme itself shifts. In other words, even though mathematics cannot transcend its episteme, it is always independent of culture because of the nature of its axioms and methodology.

History is the discipline that verifies, interprets, and systematizes past events on the basis of historical sources. Its aim is to understand the facts of the past correctly, and it relies on inductive interpretation. Inductive interpretation is a mode of thinking that draws general principles from individual facts. Since induction necessarily involves a process of “interpretation,” in which patterns are identified across pieces of information to produce broader conclusions, it is inevitably more subjective than deduction. Furthermore, historical events cannot be reproduced. Consequently, the decisions about “which information to interpret” and “how much weight to assign to particular information” rest entirely with the researcher. The criteria for these decisions are deeply influenced by the cultural values and background the researcher has internalized while growing up. Culture therefore inevitably enters into the methodology of history.

Historical assessments of Columbus clearly demonstrate this. Modern historical scholarship has revealed atrocities committed by Columbus, including slave trading and the oppression of Indigenous peoples, and many historians evaluate him as a plunderer. This interpretation is grounded in the modern episteme of “universal human rights.” Because of this shared episteme, Columbus's atrocities could be justified as “knowledge.”

Yet even within a single episteme, historical knowledge diverges according to cultural differences. An episteme establishes the minimum rules for producing knowledge, while culture determines which aspects of knowledge are prioritized within those rules. Historians themselves conduct research within particular cultural contexts, and their cultural values are therefore reflected in their interpretations of the past. A historian who follows Western cultural values might evaluate Columbus positively in terms of “opening sea routes” and “discovering the New World,” whereas a historian from an Indigenous cultural background might regard him as a perpetrator of massacres because of his “oppression of Indigenous peoples.” In a culture that regarded such atrocities as virtues, Columbus might still be celebrated as an explorer and pioneer.

Moreover, bias within historical sources themselves intensifies history's dependence on culture. Even when historical events are first recorded, the observer's subjectivity and interpretation are involved. The process of perceiving an objective phenomenon and then expressing it in language is conditioned by subjective background. Historical sources may therefore already be biased toward a particular culture. Of course, historical scholarship has developed techniques and safeguards, such as external and internal source criticism, to overcome subjectivity. Nevertheless, because these methods ultimately depend on researchers' interpretations, historical sources remain culturally conditioned.

In other words, history cannot be independent of culture because the sources being interpreted are themselves subjective, because culture influences the process through which interpretations become knowledge, and because cultural values determine which facts receive greater weight in an evaluation. Both those who record history and those who interpret it remain within the boundaries of culture. This reflects a broader characteristic of knowledge: when particular knowledge is produced, its creator's interpretations and values are often projected onto it. It also confirms that history and its methodology are far from culturally independent.

For knowledge to be independent of culture, it must lead to the same conclusion regardless of the cultural context in which it is used or understood. When determining whether knowledge within a discipline is culturally independent, the methodology—specifically, the criteria used to justify knowledge—plays a crucial role. For example, mathematical knowledge can change as axioms are expanded, but mathematical deduction remains objective and culturally independent because it proceeds from axioms that do not depend on culture. By contrast, both the subject matter and methodology of history are culturally dependent, and so is its knowledge. The cultural background of a researcher plays an important role in historical inquiry, suggesting that the subjectivity of knowledge producers enters into much of what we call knowledge.

Crucially, however, the fact that knowledge can be independent of culture does not give it absolute authority. The expansion of an existing paradigm when mathematical axioms change, as in the development of non-Euclidean geometry, illustrates this point. Moreover, knowledge cannot exist beyond the boundaries of a given episteme; this is both an important limitation and a defining characteristic of knowledge.

Ultimately, knowledge is the product of interactions between human logic and cultural values upon the intellectual foundations of an era. When we accept knowledge, we must therefore critically determine whether it represents a culturally independent “universal convention” or the “result of interpretation” within a particular culture. Only then can we pursue more objective knowledge.